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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review
completed

Secret

26 February 1971
No. 0359/71

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Tchepone Area



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FAR EAST

Indochina: *The Fighting Intensifies*

The North Vietnamese, who in the last year have often given ground before strong allied advances, evidently have chosen to make a stand in eastern Laos.

Enemy resistance has steadily stiffened as the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) has pushed deeper into the labyrinth of roads, trails, and logistics facilities that make up the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos. South Vietnamese forces on the flanks of the push are facing the bulk of Communist ground forces and are finding the going toughest. Late last week, the North Vietnamese drove a ranger battalion from high ground above Route 9 some five miles inside Laos after several days of combat at close quarters. It was the strongest enemy reaction so far, and losses on both sides were high. The South Vietnamese armored column on Route 9 itself, meanwhile, continues to encounter more modest resistance, much of it from snipers and minefields.

Communist activity behind ARVN lines also has picked up; allied positions stretched along Route 9 in northern South Vietnam are being shelled, and some supply convoys have been ambushed.

North Vietnamese Tactics

The North Vietnamese have not shelved completely their cautious, economical style of fighting of past months, but they have shown more aggressiveness and they are likely to become even more adventuresome as ARVN threatens the heart of the enemy's supply system. Antiaircraft fire, already heavy, may well get even more intense along the trail itself, where some two dozen AAA battalions are dug in. The Communists do not appear to be looking for a grand, set-piece battle, but they no doubt will keep up the pressure on South Vietnamese forces and, when they see an opportunity, will launch frontal counter-attacks of the kind they mounted against the rangers—a regiment against a battalion.

Part of Hanoi's boldness stems from the advantages it enjoys in eastern Laos: short supply lines, reinforcements close at hand, familiarity with the terrain, and prepared fighting positions. A more basic reason, however, is the stakes involved: the Communist dry-season supply effort is in full swing and the situation offers the North Vietnamese the chance to strike a blow at Vietnamization.

"Crash" Logistics Effort Under Way

Indeed, there is reason to believe that the North Vietnamese military reaction to the ARVN thrust is being keyed to these considerations. As an immediate goal, the Communists appear to be trying to hold the South Vietnamese at bay while they rush through substantial amounts of supplies—perhaps even as much this month as they had projected for the entire season.

The ARVN drive so far has hindered enemy efforts to move supplies immediately west of the DMZ and into the battlefield area. Southeast of Tchepone, lead South Vietnamese elements have pinched off several of the main enemy supply routes, but there are a number of bypasses still open over which Communist supplies are still moving. If the South Vietnamese completely sever the eastern corridor, the Communists will be forced to shift their effort to the Route 23 complex to the west, where they will be subject to harassment by Laotian irregulars and to interdiction by aircraft roaming over the relatively flat and open countryside.

Whatever the outcome of the race to cut the trail, Hanoi may well be looking in the coming weeks for a chance to deal Saigon's forces a sharp setback in the hope of shaking ARVN's confidence and calling into question some of the

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assumptions on which the Vietnamization program rests. In this case the Communists might permit the South Vietnamese to press deeper into Laos, thus maximizing their own tactical advantages, and then seek out opportunities to cut off isolated ARVN units in much the same way the rangers were routed last week. Hanoi is unlikely to be chary of committing large numbers of its troops to such an effort if the chance is there and the odds are right.

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Wind from the North Chills Laos

The military situation—particularly in the north—is continuing to deteriorate as the Communists keep applying pressure to government forces now committed to a defensive posture. Southwest of the Plaine des Jarres, enemy artillery and mortar fire are hitting the government bases at Long Tieng, Sam Thong, Tha Tham Bleung, and Ban Na. On 21 February, North Vietnamese forces seized four key outposts north of Long Tieng and infiltrated a sapper team into the Long Tieng Valley. The team was intercepted prior to fulfilling its mission, but the incident illustrated the increasing vulnerability of General Vang Pao's headquarters. North of the Plaine, the government lost one of its last important positions when Phou Cum was overrun on 23 February.

While the military contest in northern Laos hangs in the balance, the possibility of defeat is causing increasing nervousness in political circles in Vientiane. Some members of the National Assembly are seeking ways to use the legislature as a forum for criticizing Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's conduct of the war. Other assemblymen have proposed that the King make a goodwill tour to Hanoi and Peking to bring about an end of the fighting and promote peace talks.

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In the Communist diplomatic missions in Vientiane there have been some unusual developments in the past week, although they appear to be more in reaction to the South Vietnamese sweep into southern Laos than to the situation in the north. At the Soviet Embassy, the traditional Army Day reception was canceled on short notice, reportedly on orders from Moscow.

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

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

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Back and Forth on Cambodia's Eastern Front

The pattern of military activity in eastern Cambodia remained relatively unchanged as the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) dry-season offensive in that region entered its fourth week. Stubborn Communist forces continued to maintain their presence in or around several important enemy base areas, particularly in the vicinity of the Chup rubber plantation in Kompong Cham Province, while avoiding major encounters with ARVN troops.

Although no significant fighting developed on any of the ARVN fronts, several sharp actions were reported. For example, the Communists ambushed an armor-escorted ARVN resupply convoy on Route 75, east of Chup. Six ARVN soldiers were killed, 37 others were wounded, and two tanks and two armored personnel carriers were destroyed.

Elsewhere, the Communists also kept up their harassment of ARVN forces in southern Kratie Province. A heavy enemy mortar barrage against an ARVN headquarters near the town of Snuol killed 11 South Vietnamese and wounded another 50.

Phnom Penh Breathes Easier

The ARVN offensive apparently has helped ease some of the Communist military pressure against the Lon Nol government. Although the enemy has continued periodically to harass several important Cambodian lines of communication and major population centers, the over-all level of Communist military activity has declined since last month's raid on the Phnom Penh airport. With the exception of the recent bombing of the Thai Embassy, enemy terrorist acts in the capital itself have also fallen off. Nevertheless, the Communists still seem to have the flexibility to increase the tempo and scope of their dry-season campaign against the Cambodians.

Oil Stocks on the Rise

Phnom Penh's petroleum reserves are gradually being replenished. Recent deliveries of an estimated 18,000 metric tons of petroleum supplies to the Cambodian capital from South Vietnam via a series of armed riverine convoys on the Mekong have eased the threat of an oil crisis.

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There now are enough stocks in the city's petroleum depots to meet essential military and civilian requirements for at least a three-week period.

Some petroleum has also been trucked into Phnom Penh from Cambodia's only refinery at Kompong Som, as well as from Saigon and Thailand. Such shipments have amounted to less than a thousand metric tons of petroleum since last December, however, due to the continuing insecurity of key highways. Shipments from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh over Route 4 since that route was reopened in late January have been disappointingly small, primarily because of enemy ambushes that have destroyed or damaged a score of trucks. As an alternative, the Cambodians are planning in the near future to start regular petroleum deliveries by water from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh by sea and the Mekong River, using recently chartered small tankers.

Phnom Penh's longer range petroleum situation remains precarious, however. The Cambodians have not as yet implemented plans to purchase petroleum transports of their own. Moreover, their Mekong supply route is maintained by foreign ships and crews, which could suddenly abandon this service if the Communists increase their harassing attacks against river convoys.

Signs of Restiveness in Saigon

In a symbolic act of protest, often the only route open to a weak client desiring to demonstrate its independence of an overwhelmingly powerful benefactor, Saigon last week bristled at a US statement and drew an unusually sharp distinction between its views and those of Washington. The US State Department had issued a statement to the effect that Foreign Minister Lam had been expressing his personal views when he recently charged the French with maintaining an unneutral attitude and called for a change of venue for the Paris talks. Not so, said the South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry in a communiqué on 18 February; in fact, Lam had accurately reflected the official viewpoint of the Saigon government.

President Thieu presumably approved the Foreign Ministry communiqué before its release, in part perhaps with an eye on the fall elections. Thieu might have in mind dressing up his image as a leader who is his own man. Domestic politics aside, however, this affair reflects some genuine concern in Saigon over what it regards as the French Government's less-than-evenhanded approach toward the belligerents in Indochina. 25X1

Who Will Succeed Do Cao Tri?

The death of Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, commanding general of Military Region 3 (MR-3), in a helicopter crash on 23 February comes at an unfortunate time for Saigon. He enjoyed an unusual degree of respect from the men and officers under his command, many of

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whom are now engaged in Cambodia in fighting near the Chup plantation. The loss of such a commander could affect military operations at least temporarily, but his staff is competent and will probably make a special effort to provide good support to the new region commander, thus minimizing slippage within the region headquarters.

Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Minh, the commander of the Capital Military District, has been named acting MR-3 commander to replace Tri. He is trusted by President Thieu and others close to Thieu, but he has not been active politically.

As military commander, General Minh has received consistently high marks throughout his career. He also has won a reputation as a particularly energetic and able administrator. Like Tri, he has a highly personalized style of leadership; he is quick to praise and quick to blame, usually issuing orders personally and making sure they are carried out. Minh, also like Tri, has had a reputation for corruption, but this has been less obvious in recent years. As MR-3 commander, Minh would probably continue to help improve the security situation in the provinces surrounding Saigon and can be expected to run an effective campaign in Cambodia.

Viet Cong Escape the Government's Grasp

Captured Viet Cong agents are still taking advantage of legal loopholes and official corruption to escape government prosecution. An example of this occurred recently in Hue when the government prosecuted only eight of 23 alleged agents in the enemy's Hue city security section who had been arrested. Most of the others were either released or had escaped.

The government's cumbersome legal system is primarily responsible for many Viet Cong suspects' getting away. Provincial administrative personnel add to the problem by sheer ineptitude or by accepting bribes from the Communists. Also, high-level government officials sometimes order the release of suspects who are members of politically powerful religious groups, as was the case in Hue where some of the Viet Cong suspects were released because they belonged to local Buddhist organizations. Others are released because the considerable evidence that is required by provincial officials to convict them is not produced.

These evasions tend to cause apathy and suspicion among government personnel, while enemy cadre learn how to avoid future arrests. Despite the obvious need to tighten up the system, there have been few attempts at corrective action, and improvement will probably come only very gradually. In fact, there is pressure for a further loosening up. The real danger that the innocent may be unjustly jailed merely because someone denounces them recently caused the Lower House of the National Assembly to try to abolish those preventive detention laws currently on the books. Although the government appears to have fended off this attempt, it is unlikely to close off the many loopholes used by captured Communists to escape and return to battle against the government. 25X1

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MALAYSIA: Malaysia officially returned to parliamentary rule on 22 February after having been run by a National Operations Council (NOC) under a state of emergency since the racial rioting in May 1969. The NOC has now been officially dissolved, but a new security group, composed largely of the members of the former NOC, has been established and subordinated to the cabinet. In addition, a National Unity Council has been formed to deal with racial problems.

In permitting a resumption of parliamentary activity, the government is taking care to ensure continued Malay domination of the country's political life. Constitutional amendments confirming Malay privileges are the first item on the agenda, but Chinese-led opposition parties have already protested the government's announcement that all questions submitted to the government must be in Malay; the government has backed off and now will allow the submission of questions in English. There are as yet no signs, however, that any serious trouble is in the offing. If racial strife should occur, the existence of the new security group will make it a simple matter for the government to return to a state of emergency. 25X1

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Indonesia Prepares for Elections

For some months Indonesia has been preparing for national and provincial elections, the first to be held since 1955 and 1957, respectively. The army-dominated Suharto government hopes to see the formal campaigning and the actual poll conducted with as little interruption as possible to the nation's priority program of economic improvement.

The government agreed with considerable reluctance about a year and a half ago to hold elections by 5 July 1971. Once the decision was made, however, the Suharto administration proceeded vigorously with steps that it hopes will ensure its own success at the polls.

The election laws alone give the government an advantage over the political parties because they provide for a substantial number of government appointments. The Suharto administration will appoint almost one fourth of the 460-seat parliament, over one third of the 920-seat congress—Indonesia's highest policymaking body—and one fifth of the membership of the 26 provincial legislatures. Last April, under government pressure, the large, secular National Party selected a chairman who showed promise of susceptibility to army guidance—a stratagem that split the party leadership, sowed confusion in the ranks, and appears effectively to have weakened the party's election prospects. In October the government employed other tactics to split the leadership and weaken the fairly large Muslim Party.

The Suharto administration chose the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (SEKBER GOLKAR) as its unofficial vehicle to compete in the elections. A loosely coordinated group of occupational and social organizations, SEKBER GOLKAR now has an army-appointed superstructure and a greatly expanded membership, largely achieved by proselyting among groups attached to the regular parties and by the wholesale enlistment of national and provincial government employees.

Competing with SEKBER GOLKAR will be nine political parties, only three of which have a sizable following. Although campaigning is prohibited earlier than 60 days before the election date, all organizations, particularly the National Party and SEKBER GOLKAR, have been active.

The government's care in preparing for the elections stems from the army's continuing distrust of political parties in general and Muslim parties in particular. President Suharto and his colleagues feel strongly that the army, because of its cohesiveness and nationally focused loyalties, is the only organization capable of administering the affairs of the nation during this period of economic rehabilitation and political reorganizaton.

The government's prospects for succeeding in the elections are good because it is leaving little to chance. Should the parties appear to be making gains as election time draws near, it probably would simply impose more stringent controls rather than postpone the balloting. 25X1

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EUROPE

Soviets Warn of Zionist Threat from Abroad

Moscow reacted to the Brussels conference on Soviet Jewry this week with a propaganda barrage against the dangers of "world Zionism." This reaction demonstrates official sensitivity over the place of Jews in Soviet society and also reveals the anti-Semitic and reactionary impulses in the USSR that are ready to surface whenever permitted.

Commentary in the press and on radio and television assailed the conference as an "anti-Soviet provocation" staged by Zionist organizations with the support of the US and Israel. Harassment of Soviet citizens in the US by Jewish militants with alleged official complicity was treated by the media as part and parcel of the campaign surrounding the conference.

Pravda, which usually avoids extreme anti-Zionist statements, served up a diatribe with serious implications for the Soviet internal scene. Author of the two-part series, V. Bolshakov, charged "international Zionism" with assuming an important role in the attempted "quiet counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Since then, according to Bolshakov, attention has turned to the Soviet Union, where Western journalists, businessmen, tourists, and students have begun the "delivery" of documents with the purpose of organizing "some kind of Zionist underground." Bolshakov warned Soviet citizens that anyone turning to Zionist beliefs automatically becomes "an enemy of the Soviet people."

The phrase "enemy of the people" is reminiscent of the Stalin era, as is the general tone of the Bolshakov articles. Anti-Semitism has served as an emotional cement for reactionary political programs throughout Russian and Soviet history. In the past year several Soviet publicists and low-level officials have shown how compatible anti-Semitic attitudes are with Stalinist views and an abhorrence of Western influences. An example is Nikolay Starikov—a third secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Prague—who reportedly has peddled the Zionist explanation of the 1968 events to Czechoslovak conservatives and has argued that the Soviet 24th party congress in March must eliminate "Khrushchevism" from the Communist movement.

The Soviet leadership has tried to restrict expressions of anti-Semitic sentiment and in December adopted a relatively flexible policy toward Jewish activists. Death sentences for two Jews accused of a hijacking attempt in Leningrad were reduced to prison terms, and some leading Jewish dissidents subsequently were allowed to emigrate to Israel. Members of Jewish circles in several cities, however, have remained under arrest since they were rounded up in connection with the attempted hijacking last June.

Foreign efforts such as the Brussels conclave may encourage Soviet authorities to make token improvements in Jewish life and to allow conspicuous agitators to leave the country. Continued anti-Zionist propaganda in the USSR, however, will provide an outlet for political reactionaries to broadcast their message. It will also tend to justify greater restrictions on Jews and to arouse the distrust of many Russians, thus making more difficult the lot of most of the USSR's Jewish population.

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Soviets Experiment with Industrial Reorganization

The Soviets are attempting to streamline the administrative structure of their economy by grouping enterprises that use similar production technology or manufacture similar products into large enterprises called production associations. Press support for this movement has reached campaign proportions, but as yet the leadership has not given its unqualified endorsement.

Although only recently in the spotlight, the first production association was created in 1961. This form of organization was particularly favored in Leningrad where it now accounts for almost one third of the city's industrial production. In the whole country, however, there are only about 600 associations producing eight percent of total industrial output. They are most numerous in the light and food industries but have been tried experimentally in most industrial branches.

The current focus on the production association indicates the leadership's interest in finding ways to improve the economy's administrative apparatus and principles of management. A growing disenchantment with the economic reform of 1965, especially its failure to raise industrial efficiency significantly and to stimulate the use of new technology, has resulted in such experimentation.

Supporters of production associations claim that their main advantages lie in increased specialization, allowing economies of plant, equipment, and manpower and a more efficient use of new technology. Also, the integration of research institutes into some associations should cut the time required to put new products or techniques into production. In addition, the production association should reduce the need for the glavk, an administrative layer that presently exists between the enterprise and its ministry.

Opposition is strong, however, and comes from the enterprises, ministries, and glavks, who fear a loss of independence or power. Others feel that the formation of production associations may be economically unwise. They fear a return to the gigantomania of the past, and warn that enterprises will be thrown together hastily in bad combinations in the heat of the campaign.

Although some features of the production association have particular merit in the Soviet economic environment, they are not a panacea. Many of the problems that plagued the economic reform will continue to impede the associations' effectiveness. These include the system of planning from above, a jealous ministerial bureaucracy, and an incentive system that emphasizes fulfillment of physical output targets.

The current publicity may foreshadow an official decree formally proclaiming the association as the basic organizational unit in Soviet industry. Further experimentation, however, may be pursued. The major stumbling block to its immediate adoption is the lack of a clear definition of rights and responsibilities between the ministries, glavks, and production associations. [redacted] 25X1

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LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR HUNGARIAN REFORMS (1971-1974)

General Area	Proposed Act	When Scheduled	Significance
Government	--Constitutional Amendments	1971-?	The first major overhaul of the 1948 Constitution.
	--New Local Council Law	Spring 1971	To decentralize authority to local government.
Judiciary	--Judicial Reform	1972	Modernization of jurisdictional structure and legal procedure. To include a critical review of "political crimes."
	--Amendments to Civil Law	1973	Modernization of 1959 law on citizens' rights and duties.
Economy	--Law on the Economic Plan	1973	Codification of the new relationship between enterprise independence and central planning in the economy.
	--Enterprise Law	1973	First legal delineation of rights and duties of factory management in relation to central ministries, local government, and trade unions.
	--Uniform Cooperative Law	1971	Legal delineation of cooperatives' independent authority and relationship to central ministries.
Social Programs	--Youth Law	1971	"Youth constitution," cataloguing rights and social responsibilities of youth, and responsibility of social organs to young people.
	--Public Education Law	1974	Legal basis for a sweeping reform of the educational system called for at the tenth party congress.
	--Family Law	1973	Amendments modernizing existing law, to take account of changes in women's rights, adoption, alimony, paternity, and child guardianship.
	--Social Insurance Law	1972	Simplification of existing miasma of welfare (social insurance) legislation.

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Hungarian Regime Sets Timetable for Reform Program

The Kadar regime has, for the first time, publicly set a timetable for realization of "the grand social program" approved at the party congress last November.

Justice Minister Mihaly Korom recently announced a detailed legislative schedule for the period 1971-1974. Included in the program are proposed changes in Hungarian political institutions that were first broached by Kadar almost two years ago. The party thereafter deliberated intensively on the scope and direction of the changes, the speed and manner of their introduction, and on the need for careful preparation of the nation for its orderly acceptance of the new measures. The culmination of this process was the party congress last November, and it is likely that Korom's announcement might have been made earlier had it not been for the potentially unsettling effects of events in Poland.

The liberalizing aspects of the reforms, including, for example, partial decentralization of state power and the amelioration of some of the oppressive aspects of the legal code, are modest by Western standards. Their thrust, however, reflects the gradual transformation of Draconian Soviet models to more reasonable forms, suitable for present-day Hungary. Final embodiment of the reforms in the legal structure will convey confidence in the future and a final break with the worst of the past.

The extent of the proposed changes is wide, affecting almost every sector of society. The changes in social programs will probably capture most of the attention of the largely apolitical population, but other improvements, such as constitutional and judicial reform, offer long-range potential for developing a higher standard of public life. Changes in economic laws scheduled to go into effect by 1973 will codify and, more importantly, clarify the changed roles of ministries, factory management, and cooperatives that have been begun under the still-evolving economic reform.

The decision to implement the changes via legislative action of the national assembly, officially the only representative government body, will give the reforms fairly extensive exposure while avoiding any serious challenge. It will also give the parliament an active role, and thereby provide the new laws with a relatively wider national base than heretofore. In the past, such important programs have often been handled by decree—law of the executive branch—a practice that promoted arbitrary, special-interest legislation and led directly to corrosion of the esteem and authority of the national government. 25X1

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UN: Max Jakobson, Finland's UN delegate, this week began a lengthy tour of Asian capitals to promote his candidacy to become secretary general of the organization. A similar swing through Africa may be made later if an African candidate does not emerge with regional backing. Most observers, and Jakobson himself, believe Moscow favors an extension for U Thant, since his passive view of the role of the office is consonant with the Soviet attitude. Thant, however, has given no indication of his plans beyond his rather categorical statement last month that he had "no intention whatsoever" to serve another term. A stopover in Moscow on Jakobson's current trip was vetoed by Helsinki as "subject to misinterpretation. 25X1

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Problems Plague Polish Party

Polish party leader Gierek is making slow headway in his difficult task of gaining control of the party bureaucracy while simultaneously winning the confidence of the people. The process is hampered by lingering public skepticism, opposition among entrenched local functionaries, and by the lack of qualified personnel acceptable to the new leadership.

Gierek is faced with the problem of explaining to workers, emboldened by past successes, that further demands on the hard-pressed regime will be politically counterproductive. To drive this point home, an authoritative press article has warned that extremist demands are playing into the hands of old-guard party bureaucrats who are engaged in a sharp struggle with the advocates of Gierek's new style of rule.

Such public warnings and hints of an internal party struggle may be exaggerated in part in order to achieve the desired effect on the workers. Nevertheless, resistance to change undoubtedly exists among party functionaries. The rapid ouster of many provincial and local party officials in recent weeks, with more expected, suggests, moreover, that Gierek urgently needs to bolster public confidence in his policies by installing new faces among the bureaucrats who are in daily contact with the people.

There appears to be no way to allay industrial unrest through additional concessions. The regime has emphasized to the workers that the Soviet credit that reportedly made the dramatic rollback of food prices possible will have to be repaid, in economic and perhaps in political terms as well. The Roman Catholic Church also has called for calm, implying that continued unrest could endanger the country's independence. Unless Gierek can demonstrate that his rule by persuasion is effective, he may come under increased pressure from within the party—and perhaps from Moscow—to adopt a hard line.

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West Europeans Seek Air Service to East Berlin

Civil air negotiations between East Germany and several West European countries may lead to regularly scheduled flights between these countries and East Berlin by midyear. The reluctance of the three Allied powers to allow flights by other Western airlines into West Berlin has prompted the current discussions. The East Germans view the establishment of such air service as an important step in their drive for recognition in the West.

Austria was in the forefront in negotiating a civil air agreement with Pankow last year. Interflug, the East German airline, began flying twice weekly to Vienna in mid-November, and Austrian Airlines may start its service this year. Finland and Italy reportedly are discussing civil air matters with East Germany.

Last month Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) began informal discussions with Interflug about service between Copenhagen and Schoenefeld, East Berlin's airport. Interflug has agreed to SAS's proposal that each airline make three weekly flights beginning in April, that all profits be shared equally, and that Interflug arrange to transport passengers to and from West Berlin. The Scandinavian governments have told SAS not to begin actual negotiations until the Allies and West Germany resolve the problem of commercial air access to West Berlin. According to a Danish official, however, his government plans to give the

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goahead to SAS unless the Allies make a decision soon, a position probably shared by Oslo and Stockholm.

Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) is negotiating with Interflug for a stopover at Schoenefeld on its weekly Amsterdam-Moscow flight scheduled to begin this April. Interflug has agreed but has stipulated that KLM cannot take on passengers for the East Berlin - Moscow leg of the flight. KLM apparently will pick up passengers for the East Berlin - Amsterdam flight and will reimburse Interflug for its losses on the East Berlin - Prague route; passengers now traveling from East Berlin to Amsterdam must fly on Interflug to Prague, where they connect with flights to Amsterdam.

At present most air travelers arriving in East and West Berlin land at Tempelhof or Tegel, the West Berlin airports. Only aircraft registered in the US, UK, or France can fly to these airports from West Germany via three air corridors established at the end of World War II; no onward connections to the east, north or south are available. The Allied powers, in consultation with Bonn, have been discussing the question of allowing non - Three Power airlines to land at West Berlin on a north-south route, but no decisions have been made. Other West European countries appear so eager to service Berlin that, despite disapproval by the Allied powers, they may follow Austria by signing civil air agreements with Pankow. SAS, however, apparently wants to fly to East Berlin even if it is granted landing rights in West Berlin in order to share in the air traffic now being carried to Copenhagen by East European airlines. 25X1

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

France: *Strains in the Gaullist Party*

During the past two weeks old-line Gaullists have brought their displeasure over departures from traditional Gaullism forcefully into the open. President Pompidou is unlikely to respond with major changes in government personnel or policies in view of the approaching municipal elections and Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas' success in dealing with social problems.

Two of the General's old associates, his brother-in-law and the man who served as interior minister during the student-labor disturbances of May 1968, resigned from the Gaullist (UNR) group in the parliament, allegedly because local units of the UNR had accepted an alliance with the Gaullist apostate Jacques Soustelle in preparation for municipal elections next month. The resignations may have been intended to signify protest over the breadth and flexibility of Pompidou's policies.

In another dissent from current trends, the secretary general of the UNR, Rene Tomasini, spoke out to journalists against mild sentences meted out by the courts to youthful demonstrators and against the liberalized news policy of state-controlled television. Tomasini, who is close to the arch-Gaullist, Minister of Defense Michel Debre, only received his party job in January in a shuffle of minor government figures. His strongly worded comments blamed the magistrates for cowardice and the prime minister for erroneous news policies.

Tomasini's comments provoked equally strong reactions. Robed magistrates marched through the streets in protest, and both the prime minister and the justice minister let Pompidou know of their anger. Pompidou then issued a statement hailing "the impartiality and dignity with which magistrates accomplish their exalted mission."

25X1

Such a public show of division within the party seemed imprudent, however, less than a month before municipal elections, which take place only every six years and present the opportunity for strengthening the party's local roots.

25X1

On the other hand, Pompidou tends to share Tomasini's distaste for balanced political reporting on television. News reporting on television, which has long been controversial, was an issue both in the 1968 disturbances and in the 1969

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presidential campaign. It has reportedly been a principal point of discord between Pompidou and Chaban-Delmas, who has insisted that steps be taken toward reducing government control of political reporting on the screen. Pompidou's comments on Tomasini's outburst notably omitted any defense of Chaban-Delmas or any reference to the question of television.

Recognizing the need to maintain a balance within the party, Pompidou is unlikely to discard his prime minister. Although the municipal elections are an immediate reason, Chaban-Delmas' service in keeping social tension and disorder within bounds is a more important one. The prime minister, for example, has moved quietly but effectively to settle labor disputes. In doing so, he has not only won the respect of political moderates but has made a good start toward defusing the tensions that resulted in the troubles of 1968. The labor strikes and student demonstrations that took place this month were limited in extent and intensity. The worst of the strikes, involving the schedule for the closing of unprofitable coal mines, raises issues to which no one can offer fully satisfactory answers. The worst of the student demonstrations, apparently involving an instance of mistaken arrest and sentence, embarrassed the government and was resolved by release of the student in question.

The recent outbreaks of unrest, which included a brief strike of television employees, certainly served to remind Pompidou of Chaban-Delmas' usefulness. Short of another major upheaval, Pompidou will probably want to keep his present government team essentially unchanged, using gestures as needed to calm the various wings of the party.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

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Middle East: *Negotiations*

Cairo's positive response to Ambassador Jarring's proposal caught the Israeli Government by surprise and appears to have undercut its long-standing bargaining positions.

In its reply to Jarring, Egypt reportedly indicated its willingness to conclude a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai. Egyptian spokesmen have stated that Cairo has accepted all of the proposals made by Jarring, who reportedly sought to break the deadlock in negotiations by submitting his own negotiating plan to the two parties.

In a communiqué issued following a cabinet meeting on 21 February, the Israelis officially welcomed the Egyptian reply to Jarring and expressed themselves ready for meaningful negotiations on all subjects. They continued to be evasive on specific aspects of a settlement, however, and rejected what they termed Egypt's demand for total withdrawal, stating categorically that they would not withdraw to the pre-June 1967 lines. Referring to an Israeli statement made last summer in response to the US peace initiative, the communiqué indicated that Israel's position remained that it would be prepared to discuss the withdrawal of Israeli forces to secure, recognized, and agreed borders to be determined in negotiated peace agreements.

At midweek the cabinet had reportedly decided to make a reply to Jarring's proposal, apparently along the lines of Sunday's cabinet communiqué, including the assertion that Israel would not return to the pre - June 1967 lines. Press reports indicate that the cabinet was

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unanimous in agreeing to the suggestion by Defense Minister Dayan and other ministers that this statement be attached to the communiqué, and the prime minister's office has since specified that it will be included in the reply to Jarring.

The initial Egyptian reaction to the Israeli communiqué was to term it a categorical and frank rejection of Jarring's proposals and to raise once more the specter of a UN Security Council meeting on the subject. 25X1

[redacted]

Jordan: *Moving Ahead But Out of Step*

The army's skirmishes with the fedayeen in Amman last week further strengthened the government's internal security position. Not only are the commandos subdued, but the Iraqi troops are continuing to trickle their Eastern Front forces out of Jordan, reducing a long-standing element of support for the fedayeen. But in foreign affairs Jordan has begun to stumble in its relations with Egypt just at a time when Egyptian prospects for peace with Israel appear somewhat brighter.

The army's drive to clear commando weapon caches from the Amman hills resulted in sporadic fighting and a temporary closure of Amman airport, but fedayeen leaders now have agreed that the illegal weapons will be shipped to commando camps in the countryside of northern Jordan. This is in accordance with the various cease-fire protocols growing out of the Cairo agreement of last September. The commandos' acquiescence may prove significant because the weapons belong chiefly to the most recalcitrant fedayeen groups—Saiqa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The army has furnished transport, and the weapons are being moved to the fedayeen bases.

As before, the results of the fighting are becoming increasingly one-sided even in urban engagements where the army cannot use its armored superiority. In recent clashes the army claims to have captured about 200 fedayeen while killing 65 and wounding almost 200 more. Jordanian public security forces are estimated to have taken about 40-50 casualties in return. Weapons captured are claimed to be sufficient to equip two infantry companies. Should the voluntary arms dispersal plan break down, the army is prepared to renew a house-to-house search and to seize them by force. 25X1

King Husayn, however, continues to be plagued by seemingly inconsequential matters in his relationship with Egypt, just as he is coping with the previously knotty problem of the fedayeen. His planned trip to Cairo for discussions on Egyptian progress in peace negotiations with Israel was suddenly canceled. Relations between the two Arab states have cooled when international developments should be drawing them together. The ostensible reason for this turn of events has been Cairo's unfriendly regard for the proposed Jordanian ambassador as well as renewed hostility toward Premier Tal.

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SYRIA: Prime Minister Asad has begun maneuvering to have himself elected president, possibly as early as 8 March. On 17 February he appointed a 173-member "people's council," a move promised when he seized power last November. Although the assembly is expected to act as a rubber stamp for Asad's policies, its formation will probably broaden Asad's political base and is in line with the somewhat more relaxed atmosphere that has prevailed in the country since his takeover.

In a series of amendments to the country's provisional constitution, executive power has been transferred from the office of prime minister to that of the president—previously a figurehead post. President Khatib's resignation on 22 February paves the way for a referendum that will almost certainly confirm Asad in that office and so confer the stamp of legitimacy on his regime. By this action, Asad risks stirring up deep-rooted rivalries between the minority Muslim Alawite sect, of which he is a member, and the dominant Sunni Muslims; by tradition—but not by law—the country has never had an Alawite president. Asad's recent activities, however, have indicated that he believes himself sufficiently in control to carry it off.

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India: *Electoral Campaign in Final Week*

Violent incidents continue in various parts of the nation in the waning days of the Indian electoral campaign. The elections for 518 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) and for 498 seats in three state assemblies are scheduled for 1-10 March. During the past two weeks, stones have been thrown at Prime Minister Gandhi during a campaign tour, two persons were killed and others wounded in a clash between supporters of two opposing parties in the western state of Gujarat, and Hindus have battled Muslims in a politically inspired melee in the northern city of Allahabad.

By far the most serious and widespread violence continues to plague West Bengal and its capital, Calcutta. Press reports state that some 200 people have been killed in the state since January. These political assassinations were climaxed by the killing of two candidates for the state assembly within a period of four days. The second murder, that of a respected leader of a small, left-of-center party on 20 February, led to massive public protest demonstrations—including a 24-hour general strike. The police refused to blame any group for the murder, but public opinion appeared to single out the largest party in the state, the radical Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPM), as the culprit.

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Other parties in West Bengal, including the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI) and Mrs. Gandhi's Ruling Congress, have sought to encourage any popular swing against the CPM by sponsoring anti-CPM rallies. With the pace of violence likely to mount in the days ahead, the eventual postponement or even cancellation of the elections on 10 March in West Bengal appears increasingly probable, although Mrs. Gandhi on 23 February reaffirmed her government's determination to proceed with the poll on schedule.

Meanwhile, reporting from throughout India indicates the Ruling Congress is doing well, due in

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part to Mrs. Gandhi's intensive personal campaigning, in part to her party's unique control over government transportation and radio, and in part to the inability of opposition parties to work together effectively. Popular opinion in India is difficult to gauge, but the trend toward Mrs. Gandhi appears to be accelerating and her advisers are increasingly optimistic that, if there is a large voter turnout, the Ruling Congress can win a small but working majority of seats in the new Lok Sabha.

* * *

The USSR, which has adopted a low posture during the election campaign, is nonetheless keenly interested in its outcome. Soviet estimates of Mrs. Gandhi's prospects have varied since the beginning of the campaign, but Moscow too now seems to feel that Mrs. Gandhi will emerge with a working majority.

The Soviets clearly believe that a Gandhi victory will be in their best interests. As one Soviet official put it recently, the USSR is primarily interested in stability in India, and it is not in favor of change if it means uncertainty and instability. Soviet pleasure, however, will be tempered somewhat because a clear-cut Gandhi victory would reduce or eliminate Mrs. Gandhi's previous reliance on the pro-Soviet CPI and could bode ill for the long-term prospects of the party. 25X1

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Pakistan: *Unity Threatened*

Disagreements over the constitution could come to a head any time after the National Assembly convenes on 3 March, although in theory the assembly will have 120 days in which to draft a constitution that must then gain President Yahya Khan's approval.

Mujibur Rahman's Awami League (AL)—which represents only East Pakistan—plans to use its absolute majority in the assembly to force through a constitution incorporating its six-point program for provincial autonomy. The six points would limit the central government to responsibility for defense and foreign affairs and would leave all power to tax in the hands of the provinces.

Despite efforts by President Yahya and West Pakistani political leaders, Mujib has so far refused to modify his demands. Should Yahya block implementation of the six-point program, East Pakistan would react strongly, possibly even to the point of proclaiming its independence. A growing number of East Pakistanis favor outright independence over any constitutional arrangement in a united country.

West Pakistanis may well be willing to risk East Pakistani secession. Z. A. Bhutto has announced that his party—which holds the majority of the West Pakistani seats—will boycott assembly sessions unless Mujib modifies his demands. Bhutto is also trying to prevent members of other West Pakistani parties from attending. He believes that giving in to Mujib will seriously erode his own position as spokesman for West Pakistan, but he also appears to have sincere reservations about the viability of any government set up according to East Pakistani specifications.

President Yahya and senior military officers share these reservations. In their view, a weak central government would not only be a step toward the division of Pakistan into two

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countries, but would also lead to a weakening of the defense establishment and thus endanger West Pakistan.

Barring a last-minute compromise, the National Assembly is likely to draft a constitution unacceptable to the West Pakistanis and one that President Yahya would have great difficulty in approving. Yahya must be aware that rejection of this constitution would risk East Pakistani secession and he must recognize the extreme difficulty of forcefully preventing secession. He may, however, believe that the division of Pakistan into two independent countries would be preferable to subjecting the entire country to such a constitution. 25X1

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Turkey: *Increasing Violence Strains Government*

The sharp increase in urban terrorist activities since mid-February is fostering a climate of fear in Turkey and is bringing new threats to the already hard-pressed government of Prime Minister Demirel. The upsurge of violence in recent days has also sparked the resurfacing of rumors that the military may soon take over the government.

The new wave of terrorism is assuming the proportions of urban guerrilla warfare—homes, offices, and police posts have been bombed, vehicles have been burned, dynamite and Molotov cocktails have been frequently used, and a US airman was kidnaped and held for 17 hours. In Istanbul two policemen were shot and a Turkish youth gunned down later; two other policemen were wounded by dynamite explosions at an Ankara university. Armed clashes between student extremists and police during campus disturbances have also intensified, and street violence has begun to spread to provincial cities. More than 200 students were arrested earlier this week in a pitched battle in Ankara with police.

The radical left, spearheaded by the numerically small but militant Revolutionary Youth Federation, is believed to be largely responsible for the sharp increase in unrest. The recent kidnaping venture probably was intended in part to test security at US military installations in Turkey. The success of the audacious raid and the widespread publicity given the incident will encourage the left to make other, similar attempts. 25X1

Local security forces are becoming jumpy and, in some cases, they are overreacting. The government is still reluctant, however, to call on the gendarmerie and army personnel, and political leaders have done little to strengthen the government's hand in dealing with extremists of both the left and the right. Pending legislation designed to curtail extremism probably will be passed in early March, however, despite considerable opposition within Parliament. The military leadership, although maintaining a reserved silence since its several public statements early this year, is keeping a close watch on the situation, and some political-minded officers are probably becoming edgy. Unless there is a significant reduction in campus and street violence, limited martial law may soon be declared in key urban areas.

If the situation continues to deteriorate, the next few weeks could become the most crucial yet faced by the seriously weakened, five-year-old Demirel regime. Demirel himself will be subjected to increasing personal attack from the political opposition and he will be under strong pressure to resign, perhaps even from within his own party. National elections remain a distinct possibility for late summer or early fall. 25X1

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INTERNATIONAL OIL: The second stage of OPEC negotiations, those dealing with Mediterranean oil, began this week when the oil ministers of four countries—Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia—agreed that Libya should negotiate for the others and report the result to them within two weeks. The Libyans are adhering to their demand to negotiate individually with the oil companies and took on British Petroleum, an industry leader, first. Members of the oil company group expect hard negotiations and are coordinating their positions. The Libyans have declared that if negotiations with a number of the oil companies within the two-week period result in anything like a consensus, the results will be applied summarily to all the companies. Algeria's unilateral take-over of 51 percent of French oil-company assets may have been timed to put pressure on the Tripoli talks, but the issues involved in that action are not related directly to the OPEC discussions. [redacted] 25X1

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Uruguay: *Presidential-Legislative Relations Sour*

Relations between President Pacheco and congress, which were never close, have deteriorated further in the last two weeks, and a full-fledged battle may be shaping up. Because this is an election year, attacks on the President are likely to increase from all sectors.

The current impasse, resulting from the President's closure of a left-wing newspaper, is symptomatic of the problems between the two branches of government. Pacheco has ordered numerous suspensions of periodicals during his term. He closed down the leftist daily *Ya* on 16 February. On the following day, the legislature voted to lift the decree, but Pacheco responded by again ordering a shutdown on the 18th. This move provoked a storm of editorial protest from papers of all political stripes and elicited a legislative resolution warning that the President's action was unconstitutional.

Traditionally independent and jealous of its prerogatives, the congress had a similar run-in with Pacheco in 1969, but backed off. With presidential and congressional elections now only nine months away, the legislators are likely to stiffen their resistance to Pacheco's tactics and may insist on an unfettered press. The issue has added political significance in that *Ya* is recognized as the mouthpiece for the new "Broad Front" that is challenging Uruguay's traditional two-party rule this year, and the leftist parties that make up the Front are protesting. Pacheco, however, has not been prone to compromise or retreat.

Last week, the legislature failed to take action on the President's request to extend the special security measures imposed after the kidnaping of the British ambassador last month. The Tupamaros' release of the Brazilian consul last weekend—which was keyed to the lapsing of the security decree—may now prompt Pacheco to renew his request. The President's current problems extend to the executive-judicial sphere as well. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that the administration's plan to try terrorists in military rather than civilian courts was unconstitutional.

The President's difficulties will mount—in part as a result of Uruguay's unusual electoral setup that allows each of the parties to field several presidential candidates at once. This encourages factions within the ruling party, as well as among the opposition, to campaign against the

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President's record. In addition, there is a movement in the ruling Colorado Party to secure Pacheco's re-election via a constitutional amendment that would make two terms legal. The fact that Pacheco has not disowned the effort has not helped to ease relations with leading legislators who harbor their own presidential ambitions.

On almost all of the problems facing the administration—terrorism, the economy, and labor—the President has taken a hard line. Even in those areas where he has enjoyed moderate success, such as in holding down the cost of living, Pacheco has not done a good job of "selling" his accomplishments to the public. Because he shows no sign of altering his brusque style he makes an inviting, and probably vulnerable, election-year target.

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Bolivia: *Torres Attacks the MNR*

In his recent speeches attacking the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) President Torres appears to be laying the groundwork for a move against the party. Torres is trying to divide the party's younger members and its older leaders, but he is unwittingly forcing a temporary union of the warring factions of the MNR, the country's largest political party.

Twice last week, Torres attacked the "pseudorevolutionaries" within the MNR, accusing them of working with discredited military officers in the service of "imperialism." His statements were echoed by the minister of the interior, himself an MNR member, who denounced plotting by party members and who has prepared arrest lists of potential MNR plotters.

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Torres' statements also reflect his inability to woo the support of the two main MNR factions—one headed by former president Victor Paz Estenssoro, now in exile in Peru, and the other led by former vice president Hernan Siles Zuazo.

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In his public statements, Torres was careful to avoid attacking the MNR'S labor and youth members. He appears to be concentrating on gaining their support and that of lower ranking party leaders, who may see an opportunity to seize nominal control of the MNR by agreeing to cooperate with the government.

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Soviet - Latin American Economic Relations

Economic relations between Latin America and the USSR continue to present an appearance of greater involvement than in fact exists. Depending on circumstances in the individual countries, some Latin American governments and the USSR, for a variety of political and ideological reasons, have found it profitable to create the illusion, if not the substance, of close economic contacts.

Those Latin American countries that have economic ties with the Soviets tend to view these contacts mainly as a means to dispose of their surplus commodities, such as coffee. The Soviet market for most Latin American products has not grown rapidly and thus Soviet imports from the area have not grown subantially. Problems with quality, spare parts, and servicing of Soviet products also limit trade possibilities. This trade continues to be erratic and to account for only a small share of total trade.

Moreover, Moscow has continued to follow a low-profile policy toward Latin America, providing credits on near commercial terms and avoiding commitments for large-scale future aid. This policy probably derives from an awareness by Moscow of the limitations on Soviet influence in the area and a reluctance to encourage new entanglements, which, like Cuba, might prove expensive.

Against this background it comes as no surprise that a recent visit by a Soviet economic delegation to six Latin American countries apparently was primarily used by both sides to repeat past statements and to agree to keep the lines of communication open. The relatively meager press coverage of the delegation's travels, particularly by the Soviets, suggests that little was accomplished despite the fact that of the countries visited (Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia) the first four, plus Bolivia, have substantial Soviet economic credits, most of which remain unused.

The principal result of the mission's visit to Uruguay may well have been to advance by several weeks a trip to the USSR by a Uruguayan trade delegation to discuss the $20-million credit extended two years ago. Reporting from Brazil suggests that nothing was done to activate the $85-million credit extended to Brasilia in August 1966 and renewed last year.

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The Chilean press, which gave the delegation considerable coverage, mentioned a number of projects that presumably might be financed under the 1967 Soviet credit of $55 million. An official source noted, however, that the discussions were only exploratory and that the development of one or two fishing ports is the sole agreed project at this time. Peru requested that the $28-million credit extended it last August be used to develop a fishing industry. The Soviet mission also discussed possible projects in the petroleum and steel industries, probably under the same credit inasmuch as additional credits were not offered.

[redacted] that aid in electrification and road construction may have been discussed, but the two sides are far apart on the modalities involved. Moscow may try to take advantage of Quito's ouster of the US Military Group to promote the supply of Soviet equipment, although the Ecuadorean military is divided on this question. Electrification projects as well as heavy-machinery purchases were discussed by the mission in Colombia. The Soviets left there for home without even going through the motions of visiting Bolivia to discuss implementation of the $27.5-million credit extended last August. [redacted]

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BRAZIL: The Catholic hierarchy at the twelfth general assembly of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops has deplored the use of torture by security forces. In another example of the prelates' increasing tendency to denounce publicly any moves by the government against clerics, the bishops sent one of their number who has been charged with subversion a message in which they state that "the phenomenon of tortures undoubtedly exists in our country." The bishops also sent a message of support to the Archbishop of Sao Paulo, who had presented to the assembly a report on his public condemnation of police for torturing a priest and a social worker last month. The government now has scheduled a meeting of its Human Rights Commission for the near future; the bishops' charges are likely to be the main topic. [redacted]

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EL SALVADOR: The kidnaping and assassination of a prominent member of the oligarchy last week and threats received by other wealthy Salvadorans have created a climate of anxiety in the country. There is still uncertainty as to the identity of the kidnapers but a small group of leftists, possibly university students, is suspected. Some military officers are pressing the government to take punitive action against the extreme left and the university. Leaders of the opposition Christian Democratic Party are deeply concerned that they may also become a target of rightist persecution. This would represent a serious setback for the fragile structure of constitutional democracy in El Salvador. [redacted]

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Guyana's Rising Political and Economic Dissatisfaction

Prime Minister Burnham's efforts to control the economy have caused the level of dissidence in Guyana to rise perceptibly. Although it has not reached a critical stage, dissent is being expressed more emphatically and publicly than at any time in the past several years.

Among the fundamental causes are the high rate of unemployment, unfulfilled economic expectations, racial tensions, and a Communist-led opposition. Four new pressure groups have been formed recently: the Guyana Anti-Discrimination Movement (GAM), Fundamental Rights Action Committee (FRAC), Movement Against Oppression (MAO), and the Patriots. All four claim to be apolitical and dedicated to the preservation of democratic processes and safeguards. Their avowed purpose is to arouse and mobilize public opinion on current issues. With the exception of MAO, leadership in the groups has been drawn from among the country's young lawyers and other professionals and the business-oriented upper and middle classes. MAO is recognized as having a potential for violence, and many of its members are known criminals and thugs. Although all four groups apparently hope to become political parties, their minimal organization and lack of mass support indicate that such a development is unlikely in the immediate future.

The rising level of discontent, however, is linked in part to the government's attack on the private sector. The announcement on 23 February that Prime Minister Burnham intends to introduce a bill in parliament to "nationalize with reasonable compensation" the Demerara Bauxite Company, a subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of Canada (ALCAN), generated anxiety throughout the business community. Many Guyanese appear to be in sympathy with Burnham's objectives, but labor and business circles fear that the move against the bauxite industry may result in a decline in employment and in the economy in general.

A further irritant to the commercial sector is the External Trade Bureau (ETB), which was established by the government last year to handle trade with Communist countries and has been expanding control over a widening range of imports. The government's actions in this field led a Chamber of Commerce spokesman and leading businessmen to file suit on the grounds that some aspects of the ETB's policies are unconstitutional.

The labor sector also appears particularly concerned over the government's efforts to gain control of the economy. There have been a series of public exchanges between the Minister of Labor and leaders of the Trade Union Council (TUC), a general labor organization. Labor leaders theorize that if the government succeeds in controlling the economy, it could also gain greater control over the divided labor movement in Guyana.

In the past, Burnham has enjoyed considerable backing from some of the same sectors that are now leading the attack against him. These elements claim he has reneged on promises to reduce prices, provide more and cheaper goods, and raise the standard of living of the "little man." Should Burnham win out in the current dispute with the bauxite industry and forestall an economic decline, the current level of dissidence may subside. Should he fail, however, the dissidence could reach dangerous levels and perhaps provide the Communist-led opposition with an opening it does not now have to exploit the situation.

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

The Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left Under Allende

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№ 44

25X1

26 February 1971
No. 0359/71B

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THE CHILEAN MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT UNDER ALLENDE

During his first hundred days as president, one of Salvador Allende's chief accomplishments has been to handle adroitly the disparate political forces in the governing Popular Unity (UP) coalition. At the same time, he has chosen until very recently to give a remarkably free hand to the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a small, controversial group of extremists outside the UP. The two dominant—and rival—components of the UP view the MIR quite differently. The orthodox Communist Party (PCCh) strongly condemns the revolutionaries as a threat to the party's own methods and influence. The more extremist Socialist Party (PS), and particularly the hard-line faction that now dominates it, however, treats the MIR as a favored protegé. PS Secretary General Altamirano and his supporters reportedly see the MIR as a tool to force the pace of Marxist revolution in Chile and to ensure that the process becomes irreversible.

Allende has given the MIR an important role in his personal bodyguard and in the new Chilean internal security mechanism that is being developed with Cuban "technical help." In January, he pardoned nearly 50 young terrorists—most of them MIR members—who had been indicted or imprisoned on criminal charges by the former government. For many weeks Allende's government did nothing to curb the mounting wave of disruptive agrarian land invasions that have largely been incited by the MIR. By mid-February, however, Communists were complaining over MIR actions and government appointments

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History

The MIR was formed in the early 1960s by a group of disparate radical leftists whose main bond was impatience with the legalistic and traditionally political path taken by the Chilean Marxist parties, the Socialists and the Communists. Little was heard of the MIR for the next several years. During this time, however, its younger members were active in several university student organizations and in developing a revolutionary program and capability. Some went to Cuba for training. At the MIR convention in 1967 these "young impatients" forced the old-guard leadership out and took control. The new leaders, mostly from the University of Concepcion, won control of the student federation that same year. Other MIR activists had a role in the student disturbances that increased about that time. They have been responsible for shifts to the left in even the most conservative private universities and secondary schools in Chile.

In addition to their growing organizational activity among students, peasants, and urban squatters, MIR cells began a series of robberies in 1968 that showed surprisingly good organization and preparation. These thefts were intensified in

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1969, netting automobiles, arms, documents, and substantial amounts of cash. Only a few of the perpetrators were caught. The MIR claimed that these were not crimes, but "revolutionary expropriations" to support its program of mobilizing and assisting "the exploited Chilean masses."

Terrorism and violence had been rare in Chile, and there was a marked official and public tendency to ignore or to play down increased MIR activity as youthful escapades, despite evidence that improved subversive techniques were being used. The Frei government was eager to preserve an appearance of normality before the 1970 presidential elections. The government was reluctant to act against the MIR because of fear of setting off the retaliatory kidnapings that were occurring in other Latin American countries. The Chilean security forces were neither accustomed nor trained to act effectively against terrorist groups, and they were not urged to do so.

The MIR employed psychological measures as well. These included sympathetic publicity and at least implied threats of retribution. For example, Senator Carlos Altamirano, leader of the Socialist Party's (PS) radical wing and the MIR's chief promoter and protector, said in mid-1969 that an "offensive" would be mounted against the government if police searches against the MIR were not called off. Judges, many of them also law professors, reportedly hesitated to mete out stiff sentences to terrorists for fear of retaliation by students.

The MIR's use of subversive techniques reflected not only Cuban training, but other international contacts. In June 1969, it was discovered that several young European visitors who were in contact with the MIR had brought false passports, weapons, and other specialized supplies into Chile. Other European contacts included a French professor, in Chile under an official cultural exchange, who was deported after being convicted of hiding a fugitive MIR leader. Although receiving outside aid, the MIR appeared to be increasingly nationalistic and self-assured, and it apparently grew no larger despite the greater frequency and success of its activities.

The arrest of some bank robbers in 1969 and early 1970 revealed internal divisions within the group and the alleged existence of breakaway factions.

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By early 1970, the MIR had become an issue within the Communist-Socialist coalition, known as the Popular Unity (UP), that was backing Socialist Salvador Allende in his fourth attempt to gain the presidency. The Communists, chief architects of the UP, were optimistic over the prospects of this popular front strategy against divided political opposition. They considered the activities of the maverick MIR a threat to the "peaceful road" to power. The Communists blamed the MIR for the successful impact of a law-and-order electoral campaign waged against Allende by a conservative candidate. The MIR in turn reiterated its rejection of elections as mere "domestication of the masses" rather than the revolutionizing that was required. The revolutionaries criticized the PCCh as stodgy, sectarian, and subservient to Moscow and warned that the rightists would never allow Allende to take office. When Allende's chances of election improved in mid-1970, however, the MIR was persuaded to curtail its more flamboyant activities.

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Organization

Besides its small size and tight discipline, one of the MIR's most valuable assets is the compartmentation that has protected its security. The MIR apparently relies on a core of about 600 militants, whose emphasis on mobilizing, training, and organizing others has built up a much larger body of supporters. Many of these supporters are members of peasant or slum organizations manipulated by the MIR. In mid-1970 it was estimated that the MIR controlled about 20,000 squatters in slums in and around Santiago. About the same time, the group began a major effort to organize dissatisfied peasants and Indians in southern Chile.

Most of the 600 MIR members are presently or were recently university students from privileged economic, social, and political backgrounds. Their dedication to urgent revolutionary change is combined with a knowledge of the vulnerabilities and complexities of Chilean politics and psychology, good contacts in influential circles, and an ability frequently to utilize this knowledge to their advantage. Despite differences over tactics, the original group that took control of the MIR in 1967 is still largely in command. The secretary general is Miguel Enriquez, son of the former rector of Concepcion University (who was forced out by the MIR) and nephew of two former influential Radical Party legislators. Other known leaders include Enriquez' brother Edgardo and his brother-in-law as well as Andres Pascall, who is Allende's nephew, the son of a Socialist deputy, and the son-in-law of the leftist rector of Catholic University. Others are children of well-known members of the Christian Democratic (PDC) and National (PN) parties. Miguel Enriquez' chief rival for leadership apparently is Luciano Cruz Aguayo, half-brother of an officer who was retired from the army in 1970 for involvement with the MIR.

Andres Pascall
Allende's Nephew

Miguel Enriquez
MIR Secretary General

Another leader is Jorge Fuentes, until recently president of the University of Concepcion student federation. When Fuentes returned from a meeting in Havana of the Castro-supported Latin American student Organization (OCLAE) in January 1970, he announced the formation of a Chilean Committee of Support for the Bolivian National Liberation Army guerrilla group. Both Altamirano and Allende were named directors of the committee. The MIR is believed to have collaborated with it as well as with other Socialist-sponsored groups while retaining its own identity.

The didactic function—i.e., training guerrillas and organizing the poor to make them aware of their problems as well as inciting them to violent action—appears to be a major part of the MIR program. In both Santiago and Concepcion the homeless squatters it organized invaded land and set up shantytowns. The MIR members remained with the settlers, providing health and medical services, setting up schools, planning and building

MIR Militiamen

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shelters, planting gardens, and otherwise helping the occupants to organize and look after themselves. Ideological instruction was probably another offering. Under the Frei government the MIR also organized militia that patrolled the perimeters of the settlements to keep out the regular police, thus providing a refuge for MIR fugitives.

Other MIR cadres remained active among students and peasants in the period before the presidential election. Efforts among urban workers appear to have been less successful than the other MIR organizational activities. In 1969 a group of worker-members broke with the MIR to form their own revolutionary group, claiming that they were made to feel inferior by the better educated leaders. Workers probably resented the MIR criticism that Chilean organized labor was materialistic and had been lulled by the PCCh and moderate Socialists into "bourgeois" attitudes.

Motivation and Methods

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the MIR leaders' frequent and public claims of total dedication to the overthrow of the traditional Chilean institutions by revolutionary action. They preferred the re-election of conservative former president Jorge Alessandri in September 1970 on the grounds that this would be the most effective path to arouse the poor and increase their interest in revolutionary action. MIR leaders continue to mistrust the conformity and orthodox methods of the PCCh as slow and ineffectual. They realize, too, that the PCCh considers the MIR its most dangerous rival on the left and would like to eliminate it.

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What leaders such as Enriquez see as the outcome of the long revolutionary war they claim is necessary to educate the masses to an awareness of their own best interests is not clear. The voice and the publicity provided the MIR for several years by the Chilean news media have benefited the MIR but have not clarified its ends. The message remains negative and iconoclastic, even under a Marxist government. The arrogation to themselves of protection as well as incitement to revolution may be the limit of the MIR leaders' reach.

If MIR's ultimate aims are in doubt, however, the efficacy of its methods thus far is not. A combination of well-planned, effective subversive activity and an informed psychological offensive has transformed it from an indulgently tolerated band of radicals to a disciplined force with political influence. The MIR's infiltration of the armed services was aimed at vulnerable points at various levels to obtain useful information as well as supplies. The real extent of the infiltration is not known.

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The MIR's exploits and publicity fed the group's zeal and boldness and attracted support for its activities. Some influential Chileans excused MIR's acts as the deeds of Robin Hoods and brushed off as a passing phenomenon the increased evidence of the MIR's use of violence and subversion. The MIR has fed this image by organizing literacy programs in prisons and providing genuine assistance to the poor among whom it agitates.

The logistics aid provided by Altamirano and other PS officials has proven vital to the MIR, although it probably has strings attached. The aid facilitates the MIR's priorities. These include freedom to take direct action in response to opportunity, constant mobility, dispersion of forces, retreat from unfavorable combat, and the maintenance of the initiative.

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The remains of training camps, believed to have been established by the MIR for other revolutionary groups, have been discovered in various areas of Chile over the past two years. They show careful preparation and use of paramilitary methods. Some of the camps were apparently cooperative efforts; they included representatives of revolutionary groups from Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and other countries. The extent and nature of MIR ties with these groups before Allende took office is unknown but is now likely to increase.

The MIR and President Allende

When the UP won the presidential election, the particular appeal of the MIR seemed superfluous, and the PCCh renewed its determination to get rid of this annoying group. The MIR showed no interest in joining the coalition, and there were reports that its leaders would leave Chile to join revolutionary groups in other countries. It was not long, however, before it became apparent that the MIR was acquiring a role under President Allende, particularly in the field of internal security, and that it intended to use its influence to ensure the maintenance of revolutionary momentum by the government. Miguel Enriquez announced recently that the MIR struggle will not be over until it considers the capitalistic system dead in Chile.

Guerrilla Instructor in Police Custody

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Allende's confidence in the MIR stems largely from its successful penetration of the plot that resulted in the death of Army Commander Schneider and whose failure strengthened Allende's hold on a constitutional claim to the presidency. Capitalizing on Allende's obsessive fear of plotting against him, the MIR has parlayed its charges of continued antigovernment plotting by "lean and hungry rightists" into a psychological weapon threatening a wide range of Allende opponents, including former President Frei.

In its efforts to goad the new government, the MIR has vowed to maintain its

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"politico-military structure" intact so long as its leaders consider it necessary. Using its frequent journalistic mouthpiece and supporter, the pro-Castro magazine *Punto Final*, the MIR has made clear its postelection position as revolutionary gadfly and watchdog. It rejected in advance the validity of any concessions by the UP. Like the PS, the MIR opposed as a compromise the PDC support for Allende in the October congressional run-off to confirm his election. Neither Allende nor the PS joined the UP criticism of the rowdy take-over in October 1970 of memorial ceremonies for Che Guevara by the MIR and its squatters' organization.

Soon after taking office Allende took positive steps to help the MIR. He dissolved the riot control unit as the organization had demanded and pardoned MIR leaders accused or imprisoned on criminal and security charges by the previous government. In early December he provided the tacit support that gave the MIR a victory over the PCCh in a violent student election confrontation in November 1970 at the University of Concepcion.

The MIR is now playing a major role in inciting widespread rural land invasions and has set up a revolutionary peasant group that is demanding a more drastic agrarian reform law. A

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French Revolutionary ideologue Regis Debray praised the MIR as the structural nucleus in the process of revolutionizing Chile when he arrived in Santiago following his release from Bolivia where he was serving a jail sentence for being involved in the ill-fated Che Guevara "guerrilla war."

Allende's political astuteness is one of his most effective assets in a government of contending factions. He may have seen the MIR as a weapon to avoid the PCCh's domination of the administration and his favorable treatment of it as a way to gain approval from extremists in his own Socialist Party. Now, however, Communist and Radical Party leaders of the UP are very concerned over the continuing appointments of MIR members and other extremists to key government posts. Allende was recently reported to have said that the MIR has gone too far; that its extensive use of violent tactics in rural areas and its alleged organization of a new guerrilla camp are causing him trouble and embarrassment, and that they are a challenge to his authority.

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